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ABSTRACT
By focusing on the impact of Chinese engagement in Uzbekistan, this article pro-
motes an understanding of the motivations of Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan
in strategically engaging China. Although China’s Belt and Road Initiative has
received wide coverage, few details of other Chinese projects and their impacts have
been analyzed. The article aims to fill in this gap by outlining the latest project details
of Chinese engagement and their impact in this region.
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INTRODUCTION
The strengthening of Chinese inﬂuence in Central Asia (CA) has been a result
of an overall increase in China’s global inﬂuence. Indeed, the patterns of
Chinese economic and political expansion in CA are not much different from
that in other parts of the world. CA represents an area of vital interest for
China for various reasons, including security concerns (such as separatism,
terrorism and extremism); economic potential (CA is an energy-resource-rich
area with a vast market for Chinese goods); political importance (balancing
the presence of other powers such as Russia and the Afghanistan-invested
US); and infrastructure potential (CA could become a transportation hub for
Eurasia). In this sense, the motivations behind the Chinese presence in this
region are clearly outlined in Chinese ofﬁcial discourse as well as in the
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analyses of academicians.1 However, in regard to the interests and motiva-
tions of CA states, the coverage is mainly limited to wishing to join the
bandwagon. The general picture of CA states is usually drawn from the real
or imagined attempts of these states to balance the powers of China, Russia,
and the US (and other states); new Great Game rhetoric; or a pure utilitarian
attitude toward China’s vast ﬁnancial resources and market for energy re-
sources.2 While Chinese motivations for engaging in CA are fairly well cov-
ered in the literature, few studies analyze how Chinese economic expansion
ﬁts the domestic plans and priorities of Central Asian states.3 And few studies
focus on the role and place of China (both its government and its corporate
community) in the modernization of these societies. There is also little
attempt to describe not only the outcome of Chinese–Central Asian coop-
eration but also the process of agenda-setting for cooperation and how this
agenda is then implemented.4 Chinese and Central Asian policymakers often
note that their cooperation has mutual beneﬁts and that all sides involved are
in a position to set and redeﬁne the agenda for cooperation. However, in
many cases, the commentaries on such cooperation schemes tend to empha-
size the economic strength of the Chinese and their persistence in lobbying
for economic beneﬁts in CA, while Central Asian states are depicted as mere
consumers of the Chinese economic, political, and social agenda.5
1. See e.g. “Uzbekistan I Kitaj gotovy prodvigat stroitel’stvo novogo Evrazijskogo konti-
nental’nogo mosta” [Uzbekistan and China are ready to promote construction of new Eurasian land
bridge], interview with Ambassador of China to Uzbekistan Sun Lijie, Podrobno, June 2, 2017;
Oybek Madiyev, “Why Have China and Russia Become Uzbekistan’s Biggest Energy Partners?
Exploring the Role of Exogenous and Endogenous Factors,” Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies 1,
March 15, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.22261/QYJ7IT>.
2. For a narrative of Chinese interests in CA, see Andrew Scobell, Ely Ratner, and Michael
Beckley, China’s Strategy toward South and Central Asia: An Empty Fortress (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Project Air Force, 2014): 27–48, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR525.
readonline.html>, accessed September 23, 2017.
3. On the complementarity of Chinese Belt and Road and Kazakh domestic Nurly Zhol policy,
see e.g. Nargis Kassenova, “China’s Silk Road and Kazakhstan’s Bright Path: Linking Dreams of
Prosperity,” Ponars Eurasia, 2017, <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/china’s-silk-road-and-
kazakhstan’s-bright-path-linking-dreams-prosperity>, accessed October 2, 2017.
4. On Chinese domestic agenda-setting in foreign policy, see Linda Jakobson and Ryan Man-
uel, “How Are Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China?” Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies 3 (2016):
101–10, doi:10.1002/app5.121.
5. On increasing Chinese global assertiveness, see Nien-Chung Chang Lao, “The Sources of
China’s Assertiveness: The System, Domestic Politics or Leadership Preferences?” International
Affairs 92 (2016): 817–33, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12655.
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Uzbekistan’s relations with China are of special importance in this re-
gard. As is frequently noted by scholars and practitioners, Uzbekistan is
centrally located, resource-rich (especially in rare metals and natural gas),
and the most populous country in CA, with a population almost equal to
the population of all other Central Asian states combined. Such advanta-
geous central, resource, and demographic positioning alone suggests that
any instability in this country may raise questions about the stability of CA
in general, and have a critical effect on Chinese plans for the Belt and
Road Initiative and other schemes in this region.6
Above all, what attracted region watchers and experts to the foreign policy
of Uzbekistan recently was the long-anticipated change of power after the
death of Islam Karimov, the ﬁrst president of Uzbekistan, in September 2016,
and the appointment of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as interim president, and then
his election to the presidency in December 2016.7 While Karimov was famous
for balancing the inﬂuence of all regional and non-regional states in his quest
to solidify his hold on economic and political power, the change of leadership
signiﬁed an opening up of the country to new engagement with the inter-
national community. At the same time, this opening up has raised many
questions about the direction of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in the post-
Karimov era. Some scholars predict a policy of distance from all powerful
states, while others argue that Uzbekistan will follow a pro-Russian or, alter-
natively, a pro-Chinese foreign policy.8
6. National Development and Reform Commission, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” March 30, 2015, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce, PRC; Ofﬁce of the Leading Group for the Belt and
Road Initiative, Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China’s Contribution (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 2017), <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.ﬁles/upload/CMSydylyw/
201705/201705110537027.pdf>, accessed March 12, 2018; Timur Dadabaev, “Silk Road as Foreign
Policy Discourse: The Construction of Chinese, Japanese and Korean Engagement Strategies in
Central Asia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018): 30–41.
7. Timur Dadabaev, “The Constructivist Logic of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy in the Karimov
Era and Beyond,” Uzbekistan Forum and Virtual Special Issue, Central Asian Survey (September
2016): 1–4, <https://www.tandf.co.uk//journals/pdf/8_Dadabaev_ﬁnal%20220916.pdf>, accessed
June 9, 2018; Timur Dadabaev, “Uzbekistan as Central Asian Game Changer? Uzbekistan’s Foreign
Policy Construction in the Post-Karimov Era,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, May 18, 2018,
<doi.org/10.1177/2057891118775289>.
8. Samuel Ramani, “Are Uzbekistan’s Ties with China Headed For a Change?” Radio Free
Europe / Radio Liberty, September 12, 2016, <https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-uzbekistan-
china-relations-change-karimov-death/27982369.html>, accessed September 23, 2017.
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Considering these issues, this paper raises several questions: How has the
change of leadership inﬂuenced the change in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy
behavior in general and speciﬁcally in its policy toward China? What areas
does Uzbekistan prioritize in engaging China? What are the institutions and
motivations for setting up the agenda for this cooperation?
By providing answers to these questions, this article ﬁrst contributes to the
understanding of the impact of Uzbekistan’s change of power and its evolving
relations with China. Second, I explain the motivations of strategically
important (in terms of economy, demography, and political capability) Cen-
tral Asian states such as Uzbekistan in engaging China. Third, I provide
details of Chinese engagement in this region by outlining the latest project
details. Although China’s Belt and Road Initiative has received wide cover-
age, few details of the Chinese projects that constitute Belt and Road engage-
ment (aside from infrastructure) and their impacts have been analyzed.9
To answer the questions listed above, I ﬁrst analyze two major documents
adopted after the change of leadership in Uzbekistan: the January 2017
“Strategy for Further Development” (covering 2017–21) and the January
2018 foreign policy speech of President Mirziyoyev.10 Both documents deﬁne
priorities in Uzbekistan’s development and the regional and non-regional
states that Uzbekistan considers most important. Through this analysis, this
paper aims to identify the role of China in Uzbekistan’s emerging foreign
policy in the post-Karimov era. Next, I explain how cooperation between
Uzbek and Chinese policymakers in the areas of Uzbek concern is made
possible by describing how the intergovernmental bureaucracy works and
the norms and practices of bureaucracy shared by both countries. The anal-
ysis then outlines several areas of cooperation, with a description of the
agreements achieved during the visit of President Mirziyoyev to China in
May 2017, and how these agreements have been implemented. This part of
the paper aims to demonstrate that the agreements signed in Beijing focus
almost exclusively on areas coinciding with those selected for the national
9. Sarah Lain, “Russia and China: Cooperation and Competition in Central Asia,” in Tiang
Boon Hoo (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi (London: Routledge, 2017): 74–95; Timur Dada-
baev, “Engagement and Contestation: The Entangled Imagery of the Silk Road,” Cambridge Journal
of Eurasian Studies 2018, 2: #Q4GIV6, <https://doi.org/10.22261/CJES.Q4GIV6>.
10. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, “Effektivnaya Venshnyaya Politika: Vazhneishee Uslovie Uspeshnoy
Realizatsii Vneshnei Politiki” [Effective foreign policy: the most important condition of the successful
foreign policy], January, 11, 2018, <http://press.natlib.uz/ru/edition/download?id¼4558> accessed June
9, 2018.
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development strategy of Uzbekistan. Although there are very important secu-
rity interests shared by China and Uzbekistan, due to space limitations and
the large number of studies addressing this topic, this paper does not describe
the history of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s relations with
Uzbekistan or the history of diplomatic relations that can be found else-
where.11 It focuses almost exclusively on explaining the development of
various areas of cooperation under the new leadership from September
2016, to highlight the latest trends and developments in relations between
the two countries.
Through all of its sections, this article aims to deliver the message that
Uzbekistan is engaging China in a new domestic and international environ-
ment of opening up after decades of Karimov’s rule. In particular, Mirziyoyev
aims to change the strategy of Uzbekistan from reactionary (mainly reacting
to changes in the international environment) toward proactive. In such
a shift, China (in economic terms) is attributed an important role as a source
of technology transfer, an investor, and a market for Uzbek resources and
goods. Russia, in turn, represents a vast market for agricultural products and
certain industrial goods (cars, certain electronics), as well as a labor market.
By modernizing its technological assets and the industrial sector of its econ-
omy, Uzbekistan aims to create an economic structure that will allow it to
reduce the share of imports from other countries and, importantly, increase
the share of exports, not only to China but also to other Central Asian states.
Uzbekistan aims to take advantage of its abundant human resources and
cheap labor to create an export-oriented economy with respect to neighbor-
ing countries that suffer from either energy-resource-centered economic
development or a lack of diversiﬁed manufacturing capacity. As described
below, Chinese technology transfer might not offer the most advanced tech-
nology, but it is sufﬁcient for Uzbekistan’s goal of creating an export-oriented
industrial base. In cases where more-advanced technology is required, Uzbek-
istan chooses the Republic of Korea or Japan for technology transfer.12 In this
11. See e.g. Yuan Jing-Dong, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization (SCO),” Journal of Contemporary China 19:67 (2010): 855–69; Timur Dadabaev,
“Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Regional Identity Formation from the Perspective of
Central Asian States,” Journal of Contemporary China 23:85 (2014): 102–18.
12. In particular, the Ministry of Agriculture andWater Management of Uzbekistan is cooperating
with Japan on increasing the efﬁciency of water consumption at the consumer level. The ministry also
announced in 2017 that Uzbekistan is interested in importing technologies using hydroponic growing
methods for agricultural products from Japan, South Korea, and Iran (“RUz Budet Vyraschivat Frukty
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sense, the evolving foreign policy of Uzbekistan displays ﬂexibility in choos-
ing international partners depending on the country’s need to support
economic restructuring.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF UZBEKISTAN
AND THE ROLE OF CHINA
President Karimov’s foreign policy has been described in various ways. In the
early 1990s, Uzbek foreign policy was regarded by many as emphasizing
the importance of Russia and Turkey.13 The expert community assumed that
this trend was later reconsidered in light of perceived threats from Turkey14 and
a lack of commitment from Russia.15 Others saw signs of Uzbekistan’s pro-
Western policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, US criticism of
Karimov’s handling of the Andijan events of 2005 and the wave of color
revolutions welcomed by the US and Europe pushed Uzbekistan to the
offensive.16 Uzbekistan has since been considered to be building closer eco-
nomic and political ties with Russia, China, and South Korea, while treating
US and European initiatives as threatening to its sovereignty. These drastic
shifts were described as reactionary and opportunistic. With intensiﬁcation
of the Russian Eurasian initiative and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative
in the later 2000s, experts described Uzbekistan as moving to balance
Russian and Chinese inﬂuences by gradually improving its US ties to diver-
sify its external partners.
When Mirziyoyev became president, Russian and other media sources
speculated that Uzbekistan would move closer to Russia because of his
-
Kruglyi God,” Sputnik, September 6, 2017, <http://ru.sputniknews-uz.com/economy/20170906/
6236626/uzbekistan-selhozkulturi.html>, accessed September 23, 2017). Hydroponic growing uses
mineral nutrient solutions to feed the plants in water, without soil. This technology is important for
Uzbekistan, given the water deﬁciencies and soil corrosion in certain areas of the country. It could also
allow Uzbekistan to produce agricultural products throughout the year. Finally, India and Pakistan
have been given roles as trading and humanitarian exchange partners.
13. Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy: The Struggle for Recognition and Self-
Reliance under Karimov (Oxon: Routledge, 2017).
14. Perceived threats from Turkey included support of the anti-Karimov opposition in exile and
inﬂuence of Islamic radicals from Turkey on internal politics of Uzbekistan.
15. Timur Dadabaev, Towards Central Asian Regional Integration: A Scheme for Transitional States
(Tokyo: Akashi, 2004).
16. The Andijan events refers to the May 13, 2005, clash between the Uzbek Interior Ministry and
National Security Service and a crowd of protesters in Andijan (who the government claimed were
a Islamic radical group called Akromiya), in which a great number of civilian casualties were reported.
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perceived close personal ties to Russian elites.17 However, Uzbekistan
has since declared several principles for new foreign policy behavior
that discursively adhere to the old policy but, in practice, demonstrate
a drastic departure from the behavior of Uzbekistan under Karimov. First,
Mirziyoyev chose a foreign policy direction centered on non-alignment
with military and political blocs and non-intervention in the affairs of
neighboring states.18 This principle was reconﬁrmed in his ﬁrst address to
the joint session of the chambers of parliament in September 2016. Second,
Uzbekistan announced that its main priorities lie in improving and main-
taining its relations with neighboring Central Asian states. This principle
had consistently been stated in previous years, but there was little evidence
of its being operationalized. Mirziyoyev demonstrated his commitment
through 11 visits, two working visits, and 15 phone calls with presidents of
neighboring countries in his ﬁrst year in ofﬁce. This produced outcomes
that had been difﬁcult to achieve over the 25 years of independence of these
states. Uzbekistan managed to ﬁnd compromises with Kyrgyzstan over
border- and water-related problems; with Tajikistan over transportation
networks, air communications, and cultural exchange; and with Kazakhstan
over the opening of Uzbek market for imports and promoting Uzbek
exports and eventual intensiﬁcation of trade. Uzbekistan also announced that
it aims to develop its economic relations to export domestically produced
goods to neighboring countries and even to establish joint manufacturing
plants for Uzbek producers in other Central Asian states, such as Kazakhstan.
Therefore, for Uzbekistan, CA has become an area of not only cultural
exchange but also extended economic activity. Importantly, Uzbekistan re-
fuses to prioritize any particular country in CA (for instance Kazakhstan),
suggesting that it wants to build equally important relations with all Central
Asian states.19
17. Asatryan, Zabrodin, and Sozaev-Gur’ev, “V Moskve Zhdut Uzbekskogo Lidera i Raschity-
vayut na Konstruktivnyi Dialog” [Moscow expects Uzbek leader and hopes for constructive dia-
logue], Izvestia, December 7, 2016, <http://iz.ru/news/649838>, accessed April 2, 2017.
18. See also Falyahov, “Uzbekistan ne Speshit v Evrazijskij Soyuz” [Uzbekistan does not rush
into Eurasian Union], Gazeta, April 5, 2017, <http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2017/04/05/10612535.
shtml>, accessed September 23, 2017.
19. “Glava MID Uzbekistana otvergnul ideyu sozdaniya ‘regional’noi osi’ Astana-Tashkent”
[The head of MFA of Uzbekistan rebuffed the idea of creating ‘regional axis’ of Astana-Tashkent],
Podrobno, September 29, 2017, <http://podrobno.uz/cat/politic/glava-mid-uzbekistana-otvergnul-
ideyu-sozdaniya-regionalnoy-osi-astana-tashkent/> accessed September 29, 2017.
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Within this structure, Uzbekistan still needs to develop and diversify its
industrial base to modernize its manufacturing capacity and generate varied
types of goods of sufﬁcient quality to export to its neighbors. In this regard, as
a third principle of Uzbek foreign policy, Mirziyoyev announced that China
(along with Russia) is expected to become one of the most important non-
regional partners. This announcement was based on previous successful en-
gagements with China (for example, the China-led Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and its “Shanghai spirit”) as well as on careful calculations of
the needs of the Uzbek economy, outlined in the strategy for Uzbek devel-
opment explained below. Interestingly, Mirziyoyev further suggested Japan
and South Korea as important partners in economic cooperation, and as
sources of investments and technologies for the Uzbek economy, presumably
targeting the areas where Chinese technological advances are not considered
sufﬁciently developed. Currently, China is the second-largest export destina-
tion for Uzbekistan (Table 1).
Uzbek foreign behavior demonstrates that its motivations in respect to
both China and CA are socially constructed and contingent on the history
and legacy of previous interactions. Rationalists treat the interests of both
Uzbekistan and larger powers such as China as stable (in line with domina-
tion and survival rhetoric), and predetermined, but this paper aims to dem-
onstrate that national interests change according to both the interaction and
the environment. Therefore, both China and Uzbekistan redeﬁne their
table 1. Major Export Destinations for Uzbek Goods, 2016–17
Rank Country Percentage of Uzbek exports
1 Russia 18%
2 China 16%
3 Turkey 15.7%
4 Kazakhstan 11.5%
5 Iran 8%
6 Afghanistan 5.8%
7 Kyrgyzstan 2.4%
8 Korea 2.2%
NOTE: Excludes energy resources and services. Compiled by the author from interviews with government
officials and consultants.
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identities (that is, become who they are) within their interactions, and their
interests are deﬁned by these interactions.
Accordingly, at the current stage of its development, Uzbekistan prioritizes
CA as an area of vital importance. At the same time, the discourse of Uzbek-
istan siding exclusively with Russia, China, or the US in the post-Karimov era
was not empirically demonstrated in the ﬁrst year of Mirziyoyev’s presidency.
From the perspective of Uzbekistan, many of the projects promoted by the
EU, the US, Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan are mutually compatible.
In this context, China’s role has shifted from being a partner in providing
security and ﬁghting terrorism to being the main source of technology and
ﬁnancing for the diversiﬁcation of Uzbekistan’s economy.
In its interactions with foreign partners, Tashkent distinguishes long-term
and short-term priorities. The long-term priorities have not radically chan-
ged. They are mainly aimed at reducing imports and increasing export-
oriented manufacturing.20 The areas prioritized by the development strategy
mentioned above are rooted in an analysis of the structure of Uzbekistan’s
GDP. Per the latest economic indicators, the share of industry in GDP is only
one-third (33.1%), with the remaining shares attributed to services (almost
half), agriculture, forestry, and ﬁshery (one-ﬁfth).21
Therefore, the development strategy for 2017–21 aims to expand industry
and diversify Uzbekistan’s economy. Private-sector participation in the pro-
duction of Uzbekistan’s GDP is also very low, especially in industry, forcing
the government to take the lead in seeking foreign partners (Figure 1).
Therefore, policy supporting the development of export-oriented, small
and medium-sized private industrial production plants was announced
a couple of decades ago and has been inherited by the current government
(Table 2). However, the short-term priorities are deﬁned through various
programs that have a timeframe for implementation. Once a speciﬁc program
is completed, another deﬁnes the new short-term priorities of the country.
It would thus be incorrect to assume that Uzbekistan is prepared to accept
any agenda set by its counterparts such as China or Russia, as long as this
20. On the logic of Uzbek self-reliance, see Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro, “Uzbekistan’s ‘Spirit’ of
Self-Reliance and the Logic of Appropriateness: TAPOich and Interaction with Russia,” Central
Asian Survey 34:4 (2015): 484–98, doi:10.1080/02634937.2015.1114780.
21. State Statistics Committee, “Statesticheskoe Obozrenie Uzbekistana” [Statistic review of
Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 2017: 4.
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agenda implies investments. As a guideline for a cooperation agenda, the
development strategy outlined ﬁve areas to be prioritized:
 Improvements to the state public administration system
 Improvements to the judicial system
 Liberalization of the economy
 Development of the social sphere
 Facilitation of security, promotion of interethnic and interreligious
accord, and implementation of a balanced, beneﬁcial and constructive
foreign policy
table 2. Share of the private sector in the total volume of produced goods and
services, 2016
Industry 48.2
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery 100
Construction 66.2
Retail trade turnover 83.6
Transportation of goods 63.6
Transportation of passengers 91.4
Exports 3.8
Imports 12.2
SOURCE: State Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan.
figure 1. Share of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises by Economic Sector, 2016
SOURCE: State Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan.
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The wide spectrum of reforms required has led Uzbekistan to adopt a step-
by-step approach, beginning with improving the system of state operations
(streamlining bureaucratic procedures for more efﬁcient and corruption-free
operations) and improving the judicial system. In respect to relations with
China, “liberalization of the economy” and “implementation of a balanced
and beneﬁcial foreign policy” are of special importance. Economic invest-
ments that entail technology transfer to establish an export-oriented
manufacturing sector in Uzbekistan directly relate to cooperation schemes
planned with China. Such reforms are expected to prepare economic condi-
tions in which Chinese (and other) investors will be interested in building
plants in Uzbekistan. The liberalization of the currency—which implies elim-
ination of the “black market” rate, uniﬁcation of governmental and market
exchange rates, and guarantees from the government to convert local currency
into foreign ones without restrictions—is one of the crucial steps in this
direction, as it will allow investors to move capital in and out of country freely.
The last point, regarding foreign policy, includes not only establishing
priorities for countries but also drafting action plans and road maps for
cooperation with each country considered strategically important. Actions
plans for Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, and Kyrgyzstan have been signed
during Mirziyoyev’s visits to these countries and are now being implemented.
The action plan and its road map for relations with China was developed and
signed during Mirziyoyev’s visit in May 2017.
NEGOTIATING STRATEGY AND BARGAINING PLATFORM
In countries with a limited market economy, the state performs certain
functions to guide state and non-state enterprises toward speciﬁc areas of
development and geographic locations by motivating market actors through
economic and administrative measures. In this sense, the government struc-
tures in Uzbekistan and China are similar, in that they both strive for a devel-
opmental (as opposed to regulatory) function. Governmental ties and
communications are crucial in establishing inter-state economic ties between
China and Uzbekistan.
On the Chinese side, in the action plan drafted in 2015 by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the National Development and Reform Commission, and
the Ministry of Commerce, the ﬁve policies of policy coordination, con-
nectivity, unimpeded trade, ﬁnancial cooperation, and people-to-people
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bonds were considered of the highest importance for Chinese penetration in
this region.22 The same type of commitment has been displayed by the Uzbek
governmental bureaucracy, which prepared its own road map emphasizing
cooperation at the governmental level to facilitate trade.23 In addition, the
similarities of governmental structures and style of governance described
below have a certain role to play in simplifying cooperation between these
two countries. This may be why bilateral negotiations have been more pro-
ductive than those with free market economies where the government has
a limited capacity to inﬂuence the behavior of market participants.24
The main actors in these negotiations are the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
the Chamber of Commerce, and the Agency for Foreign Investments, and
these are coordinated by the central apparatus of the Uzbek government. The
problems and issues listed in the development strategy serve as guidelines for
the government bureaucracy, which then presents proposals to those poten-
tial foreign partners (governments) considered the best suited to assist in
these tasks. In the case of China, the list is compiled and presented in the
Uzbek–Chinese intergovernmental committee for cooperation, co-headed by
the Uzbek deputy prime minister and the secretary of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party’s Political-Judicial Committee.25
The work of the intergovernmental committee is divided among several
subcommittees, such as the subcommittees on trade and economic relations
(coordinated by the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Chinese
Ministry of Commerce), cooperation in energy (coordinated by the Uzbek
Ministry of the Economy and the PRC National Energy Administration),
transportation (coordinated by the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Trade and the
PRC Ministry of Transport), technical and scientiﬁc cooperation (coordi-
nated by the Uzbek Committee on Coordination of Science and Technology
22. Sarah Lain, “Russia and China: Cooperation and Competition in Central Asia,” in Tiang
Boon Hoo (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi (London: Routledge, 2017): 74–95, in particular 77.
23. For instance, Uzbek Foreign Trade and the PRC Ministry of Commerce signed memoranda
to facilitate the organization of producer exhibitions in May 2017.
24. For instance, such a cooperation structure was described as impossible in the case of Uzbek–
Japanese cooperation by a Japanese embassy ofﬁcial in a private conversation (September 2017,
Tashkent), due to a regulatory function of the Japanese government which cannot force Japanese
corporations into foreign cooperation schemes.
25. “Agreement between Governments of the Republic of Uzbekistan and People’s Republic of
China on Creation of Uzbek-Chinese Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation, Beijing”
(2011), available in Russian at <http://www.lex.uz/pages/GetAct.aspx?lact_id¼1986611>, accessed
September 23, 2017.
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and the PRC Ministry of Science and Technology), cultural and humani-
tarian cooperation (coordinated by the Uzbek Ministry of Culture and
the PRC Ministry of Culture), and cooperation in security-related issues
(coordinated by the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PRCMinistry
of Foreign Affairs).26
These committees meet to work at least once a year, with the issues to be
discussed communicated through the channels of the coordinating institu-
tions well ahead of the meetings. If the needs of Uzbekistan can be met by
a Chinese enterprise, the Chinese coordinating agency frequently serves as
the communication line to establish the contacts and invite the potential
investor from China to discuss the project. Each of these projects is then
considered within a subcommittee. When the interests of the sides do not
match, they move on to projects that are of greater mutual interest. In this
sense, the establishment of the committee and respective subcommittees
created a channel of communication and a sort of bargaining table that is
open throughout the year on an ad hoc basis. This committee and its sub-
committees are also a good way to signal certain policy and priority changes
for each country. They help prevent miscommunications at the political level
and provide coordination capacity for enterprise activity. Also, to facilitate
connections between businesses, several ministries (for instance, the Uzbek
Foreign Trade Ministry and the PRC Ministry of Commerce) have signed
memoranda to organize producer exhibitions, which have eventually resulted
in the visit of small- and medium-sized enterprise representatives from Tian-
jin to the Jizzakh and Sirdarya free economic areas, and the decision to
allocate certain areas in Jizzakh exclusively for entrepreneurs from that region
of China (the Tianjin metro area).27
However, this coordination capacity is only made possible through a cer-
tain degree of structural similarity in the relations between the government
and businesses, as these governments still play a much greater role than in
countries with Western liberal market economies. And once an agreement is
reached, the government of Uzbekistan still exercises signiﬁcant control over
the economic activities of the enterprises, which is problematic for companies
from other countries but acceptable to Chinese corporations due to the
26. See the appendices to the agreement cited in the previous note.
27. “Tashkent Hosts Business Forum of Entrepreneurs of Uzbekistan and China,” Jahon, July,
22, 2017, <http://www.jahonnews.uz/en/ekonomika/316/36956/>, accessed June 9, 2018.
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similarity of governmental controls in China. On the Uzbek side, there is
a separate committee created to ensure the implementation of the agreements
created for each partner country. For instance, aside from China, a separate
committee was created to ensure the implementation of agreements with the
US.28 The committee work is stipulated by road maps for cooperation with
each country, and the heads of the committees present reports on progress
and the relevant directions of the road maps to the president between the 5th
and the 10th of each month.
As a result of this work, the focus of the May 2017 visit of President
Mirziyoyev to China was obviously on the promotion of economic ties
between the two countries based on the “Shanghai spirit” bargaining strat-
egy.29 Even before this visit, Uzbekistan and China enjoyed a fair level of
economic cooperation, as seen in the list of investment projects underway
prior to 2017 announced by the Uzbek Ministry of the Economy.30 The visit
marked the signing of one of the most ambitious packages of agreements,
including 11 intergovernmental agreements, one intermunicipal agreement,
and a package of economic contracts worth US$ 22.8 billion.31 A total of 76
agreements, memoranda, and protocols were signed during the visit—35
agreements, 31 memoranda (notes of meetings that focused on particular
projects, with the general budget allocation of these projects already decided),
and 10 protocols (discussions of intent for particular enterprises).32 The most
signiﬁcant areas covered were manufacturing, resource-related investments,
and infrastructure development.
28. Decree of the President of Uzbekistan, Measures for Further Strengthening of Cooperation
with the UN, Its Structures and International Financial institutions as Well as with a Range of
Foreign Countries, PP-3293 (2017), <http://www.norma.uz/raznoe/postanovlenie_prezidenta_
respubliki_uzbekistan_ot_27_09_2017_g_pp-3293>, accessed September 23, 2017.
29. “Shanghai spirit” refers to a norm which connects the issues for cooperation prioritized by
both countries without seeking unilateral gains. This norm also implies the importance of mutual
sacriﬁces and compromises for mutual gains.
30. Ministry of Economy of Uzbekistan, “List of Investment Projects 2016,” 2016, <https://
mineconomy.uz/ru/node/1091>, accessed September 23, 2017.
31. The amount of US$ 22.8 billion includes both Chinese and Uzbek shares in the deals signed.
Thus the pure Chinese contribution/investment in the deals is roughly US$ 10 billion; the rest
accounts for the Uzbek side’s contribution, including monetary contributions as well as the costs of
land and infrastructure development.
32. “Uzbekistan i Kitai Podpisali Ryad dokumentov” [Uzbekistan and China signed a range of
documents], Review.uz, May 13, 2017, <http://www.review.uz/novosti-main/item/11214-uzbekistan-
i-kitaj-podpisali-ryad-dokumentov-spisok>, accessed September 23, 2017.
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INFRASTRUCTURE AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
The largest economic infrastructure-related agreements were those focusing
on the joint production of synthetic fuel (US$ 3.7 billion), investment
in Uzbekistan’s oil industry (US$ 2.6 billion), prospective new projects
(US$ 2 billion), cooperation in the construction of energy generation plants
(US$ 679 million), railroad infrastructure development (US$ 520 million),
and Tashkent to Osh (Kyrgyzstan) road construction (US$ 220 million).
In terms of establishing manufacturing lines in Uzbekistan, agreements were
reached on establishing production facilities for cement (US$ 153 million in
Andijan and US$ 100 million in Tashkent), textiles (US$ 200 million),
electric appliances (US$ 139 million), metals (US$ 115 million), and glass
(US$ 83 million).
One of the most signiﬁcant infrastructure agreements signed in May 2017
was between Uzbekistan and the PRC on facilitating smooth international
road transportation between the two countries, which involves the simpli-
ﬁcation of procedures and creation of an environment to increase the trans-
portation of goods using land roads (both rail and automobile). This
agreement followed all the internal procedures in Uzbekistan and has been
conﬁrmed by decree of the president.33
The project, which aims to connect China with Uzbekistan through the
territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, has also been addressed in relevant signed
agreements. It would connect the Uzbek city of Andijan and the Chinese
city of Kashgar, via Osh and Irkeshtam in Kyrgyzstan by both rail and
motor road. This is the shortest route, and both countries are interested
in its construction.34 While China has for years been interested in a number
of transport corridors to markets in Europe through CA’s transport net-
works, these particular rail and motor roads are of particular interest and
importance to Uzbekistan. They would allow Uzbekistan to shorten the
33. Decree of the President of Uzbekistan on Reconﬁrming the Agreement between Republic
of Uzbekistan and People’s Republic of China on Facilitating Smooth International Road
Transportation, PP-3143, July 20, 2017, available in Russian at <http://nrm.uz/contentf?
doc¼508717_postanovlenie_prezidenta_respubliki_uzbekistan_ot_20_07_2017_g_n_pp-3143_
ob_utverjdenii_mejdunarodnogo_dogovora&products¼1_vse_zakonodatelstvo_uzbekistana>,
accessed September 23, 2017.
34. For details, see “Uzbekistan hochet postroit Andijan-Osh-Irkisham-Kashgar” [Uzbekistan
wants to build Andijan-Osh-Irkisham-Kashgar], Kloop, September 9, 2017, <https://kloop.kg/blog/
2017/09/09/uzbekistan-hochet-postroit-trassu-andizhan-osh-irkeshtam-kashgar/>, accessed Septem-
ber 23, 2017.
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distance to transport its goods into China by avoiding Kazakh railroads,
which take longer and cost more. The new rail and motor roads would let
Uzbekistan ship its goods directly, using the shortest route to China
through Kyrgyzstan.
In 2012, Kyrgyzstan drafted its own railroad project. It would cover more
areas of Kyrgyzstan and would be 380 km longer than the current total. For
Kyrgyzstan, it would be a chance to develop its own railroad system and
connect remote areas that the rail system currently bypasses. However,
for both Uzbekistan and China, this would imply a longer transportation
time for their cargo and much higher costs for the project in general.
The plans suggested by Kyrgyzstan appear to be difﬁcult for China and
Uzbekistan to accept.35
Both Chinese and Uzbek ofﬁcials realize that there is certain degree of
caution (especially on the Kyrgyz side) with respect to Chinese infrastructure
projects, so they require public engagement and awareness. To facilitate
public acceptance of this project, the Chinese and Uzbek governments
agreed to organize an auto rally along the route of the future railroad, which
serves several important goals. First, it aims to promote to the public trans-
portation infrastructure development projects between Chinese and Central
Asian counterparts. Second, it is a practical test of the preparedness of areas
where railroad construction is planned, to determine any issues in the terrain
and to detail the infrastructure-related facilities that must be constructed in
this area. In addition to the railroad, the Chinese Railway Tunnel Group,
which built the 19-kilometer-long Kamchik Tunnel in Uzbekistan, has com-
mitted to construction of a vehicle motorway under the tunnel, naming the
project Kamchik 2.36
Uzbekistan’s exports of mineral and natural resources to China constitute
a considerable share of the trade between the countries. According to other
agreements concluded in May 2017 during Mirziyoyev’s visit to China, con-
tracts identiﬁed natural gas (6 billion m3, worth US$ 734 million), uranium
(US$ 30 million), textiles (US$ 200 million), leather (US$ 21.3 million), and
35. See e.g. Bruce Pannier, “No Stops in Kyrgyzstan for China-Uzbekistan Railway Line,” Radio
Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 3, 2017, <https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-kyrgyzstan-
uzbekistan-china-railway/28713485.html>, accessed September 23, 2017.
36. “China to Help Build Second Tunnel at Kamchik Pass,” Tashkent Times, May 16, 2017,
<http://www.tashkenttimes.uz/economy/930-china-to-help-build-second-tunnel-at-kamchik-pass>,
accessed September 23, 2017.
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agricultural products (US$ 1.6 million) as products to be exported to China
by the end of 2017. Plans have also been articulated for exports of natural gas
to reach US$ 2.4 billion for the years 2018 to 2020.37 Total exports to China
are US$ 1.49 billion, while imports are US$ 2.01 billion.
There were also discussions of new pipelines to connect natural gas-
endowed Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to Chinese consumers
to ensure a stable supply. However, no construction plans or ﬁnancial com-
mitments have yet been achieved due to uncertainties regarding the economic
sustainability of the pipelines’ operations.
Chinese companies, such as Shengli Oil and Freet Petroleum, represent
strategic partners for the government and related corporations in the provi-
sion of pipes and other extraction equipment. According to sources aware of
the negotiations between the government and Chinese corporations, at least
three contracts for the supply of such equipment were signed during Mir-
ziyoyev’s visit to Beijing in 2017.
China National Petroleum Corporation secured a co-ﬁnancing contract
from the Bank of China for a project for drilling at the gas condensate ﬁeld
in Bukhara, Uzbekistan by establishing JV New Silk Road Oil and Gas,
which was set up by Uzbekneftegaz and China National Oil and Gas
Exploration and Development Corporation (a subsidiary of China
National Petroleum Corporation).38 According to the license granted to
the joint venture, it plans to develop the existing wells and drill another 16,
with annual production to reach 1 billion m3 of natural gas and 6,500 tons
of condensate.39
In terms of the generation of new industries, Uzbekistan concluded an
agreement between Uzbekneftegaz and the Chinese Development Bank
(worth US$ 3.7 billion, of which US$ 1.2 billion is to be ﬁnanced by China)
to ﬁnance the establishment of a plant to produce synthetic fuel at
37. “Uzbekistan planiruet k 2021 godu narastit’ export gaza v Kitaj do 10mlrd” [Uzbekistan plans
to increase exports of gas to China to 10 billion cubic meters until 2021], Interfax News Agency, June
15, 2017, <http://interfax.az/view/705802>, accessed September 23, 2017; “Uzbekistan nameren
narastit postavki gaza v Kitai” [Uzbekistan aims to increase the volume of its gas exports to China],
Aziay Plus, June 15, 2017, <https://news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20170615/uzbekistan-
nameren-narastit-postavki-gaza-v-kitai>, accessed September 23, 2017.
38. “Uzbekistan-China JV New Silk Road Oil and Gas Commences Drilling in Bukhara,”
Tashkent Times, June 15, 2017, <http://www.tashkenttimes.uz/economy/1016-uzbekistan-china-jv-
new-silk-road-oil-and-gas-commences-drilling-in-bukhara>, accessed September 23, 2017.
39. Ibid.
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Uzbekistan’s largest gas reﬁnery complex, Shurtan.40 The plant would process
3.6 billion m3 of natural gas into 743,000 tons of synthetic fuel, 311,000 tons
of aviation fuel, 431,000 tons of naphtha fuel, and 20,900 tons of liqueﬁed
gas.41 Technological support for the plant is to be provided by South Korea’s
Hyundai Engineering & Construction under a license provided by South
African Sasol. The technology for turning natural gas into liqueﬁed gas would
come from Dutch Haldor Topsoe.
A US$ 3 billion agreement between the Chinese Ministry of Commerce
and Uzbekgidro stipulates the modernization of approximately 300 water
pump stations to improve the efﬁciency of Uzbekistan’s hydroelectricity
sector.42 Uzbekistan developed and approved the strategy for hydro-energy
development in November 2015 and aims to invest US$ 889.4 million in the
sector between 2016 and 2020. The modernization of 15 hydroelectric stations
is planned, to allow the generation of 5.25 billion kilowatts of energy. This
governmental program was essential in deﬁning this area as a high priority in
relations with China.
Modernization of energy generation in Uzbekistan has also been priori-
tized in negotiations. In particular, China Railway Tunnel Group and China
Coal Technology & Engineering Group began the modernization of a plant
to achieve extraction of 900,000 tons of coal per year, with investment of
US$ 94.5 million.43 Non-traditional sustainable sources such as biomass
generation have also been the subject of agreements. Uzbekneftegaz, AKB
Agrobank (also Uzbek), and China’s Poly International Holding signed
a memorandum of cooperation to set up the production of modern biogas
plants worth US$ 10 million and to assist in the modernization of eight
domestic enterprises, including the JSC Oil and Gas and Chemical
40. For details, see George Voloshin, “Central Asia Ready to Follow China’s Lead Despite
Russian Ties,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 14:71 (2017), <https://jamestown.org/program/central-asia-
ready-follow-chinas-lead-despite-russian-ties/>, accessed September 23, 2017; “Uzbekistan: Pre-
sident’s China Trip Yields Giant Rewards,” Eurasianet, May 18, 2017, <https://eurasianet.org/s/
uzbekistan-presidents-china-trip-yields-giant-rewards>, accessed June 9, 2018.
41. “Uzbekistan i Kitai podpisali soglazhenij na summu bolee 20 mlrd” [Uzbekistna and China
signed agreements for more than 20 billion], Review.uz, May 14, 2017, <http://www.review.uz/
novosti-main/item/11217-uzbekistan-i-kitaj-podpisali-soglashenij-na-summu-bolee-20-mlrd>, accessed
September 23, 2017.
42. Ibid.
43. “Startovala modernizatsiya predpriyatiya ‘Shargunkomir’” [The modernization of ‘Shar-
gunkomir’ has started], Gazeta, September 29, 2017, <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/09/07/coal/>,
accessed September 23, 2017.
764  ASIAN SURVEY 58:4
Engineering Plant, in line with the governmental Program of Measures to
Increase Biogas Plants in Uzbekistan for 2017–19.44 Last but not least, solid
waste processing infrastructure is being constructed to improve livelihoods
and facilitate better waste utilization in old and newly constructed housing in
Uzbekistan.45
MANUFACTURING AND EXPORT INDUSTRIES
As described above, the new administration in Uzbekistan has deﬁned certain
areas where China’s economic presence and technology are desired and
advantageous. In line with the goals of the development strategy, the ﬁrst
such area is the establishment of small and medium-sized manufacturing
plants to not only supplement imported products but also, importantly,
produce goods that can compete in Central Asian markets.
In particular, Uzbekistan intends to establish long-term cooperation with
the Chinese Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) for the
supply of scanning equipment (for border control services, customs, airports,
and rail infrastructure), the introduction of urban security systems (“smart
city”), the protection of large facilities and the border, the development and
introduction of an industrial Internet, joint production of a wide range of
pharmaceuticals in Uzbekistan, and the participation of CASIC in the devel-
opment of infrastructure for the Central Military Clinical Hospital of the
Ministry of Defense. This latter project includes creating a turnkey multi-
disciplinary medical and diagnostic building and equipping it with modern
medical equipment, as well as producing oil and gas equipment.46
To respond to the increasing demand for construction materials, the Uzbek
government intends to facilitate the development of a cement plant (with
Zhejiang Shangfeng Building Materials, at a cost of US$ 203.9 million)47 and
44. “Program for Increased Use of Biogas in Farms Adopted in Uzbekistan,” Tashkent Times,
June 19, 2017, <http://www.tashkenttimes.uz/economy/1060-program-for-increased-use-of-biogas-
in-farms-adopted-in-uzbekistan>, accessed September 23, 2017.
45. Beston Machinery Company, “Beston Municipal Solid Waste Plant in Uzbekistan,” undated,
<http://mswrecyclingplant.com/beston-municipal-solid-waste-plant-uzbekistan/>, accessed September
23, 2017.
46. For details, see “Ministry of Foreign Trade Discuss Cooperation with ‘CASIC’ Corporation,”
Uzreport, June 16, 2017, <http://news.uzreport.uz/news_4_e_153308.html>, accessed September 23,
2017.
47. “New Cement Plant for US$204 Million to be Built in Andijan Region,” Uzdaily, July 21,
2017, <https://uzdaily.com/PYLnM/articles-id-40176.htm>, accessed July 21, 2017.
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glass production (with MingYuan Silu, at a cost of US$ 110 million).48
Another joint venture has been established in Gulistan City, focusing on
the production of elevators. In the Soviet era, Uzbekistan relied heavily on
elevators produced in other republics, namely Azerbaijan and Russia. With
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the replacement of installed elevators
required importing them in great numbers. To ﬁll this gap and respond
to the increasing need for elevators in the booming construction business in
Uzbekistan, the government sought China’s assistance in facilitating the
production of elevators in Uzbekistan. As a result, a joint venture for
the production of elevators (Modern Lift Systems) has been established in
the Syrdarya Region of Uzbekistan, funded by Chinese investors and using
Chinese technology. It produces 300 elevators per year, plus 200 escalators
and travolators (moving walkways). Although the joint venture produces
elevators for internal consumption, approximately 30% of its products are to
be exported to other regional states.49
In terms of memoranda and protocols, some of these have already
materialized in production facilities, such as the one for the production
of soft and hard toys in Tashkent, based on the Soviet-era toy factory
Tashkentigrushka.50 As mentioned, Uzbekistan is the most populous country
in CA, and 60% of its 32 million people (2017) are under 25. The population
has the highest growth rate in CA, which creates a big market for toys and
child-related products. In the Soviet era, Uzbekistan hosted one of the biggest
toy factories. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and aging technology,
the plant became unable to meet the needs of the market. The quality of toys
imported from other countries, including China, was at the level expected by
consumers, motivating the government to seek a solution to this issue.
Imports of toys reached US$ 2.1 million in 2016, but fell 29% in 2017 due
to increasing local production. As mentioned, 94% (US$ 2 million) of the
toys imported into Uzbekistan are from China; Russia’s share is only 2.1%
48. “Glass Production Plant to be Considered in Uzbekistan,” Uzdaily, September 21, 2017,
<https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-37934.htm>, accessed September 23, 2017.
49. “Proizvodtsvo liftov zapuscheno v Uzbekistane” [Production of elevators launched in
Uzbekistan], Gazeta, September 29, 2017, <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/09/29/lifts/>, accessed
September 23, 2017.
50. “O merakh po organizatsii sovremennogo proizvodstva detskih prinadlezhnostei i igrushek
v gorode Tashkente” [Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on measures for
organization of production of children’s accessories and toys in the city of Tashkent], PP-3115, July
6, 2017.
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(US$ 43,000), with the remaining 0.8% (US$ 16,000) from Lithuania.51 The
new factory (jointly established with Shandong Sanhe Toy) cost an estimated
US$ 23 million, makes 700 kinds of plastic, soft, electronic, and mechanical
toys, and provides 950 jobs in Tashkent.52
The majority of these projects attempt to establish production- and
infrastructure-related facilities to enable Uzbekistan to produce goods not
only for its large (but still limited) internal consumption but also, impor-
tantly, for export. The toy factory aims to produce seven million individual
toys annually, of which 80% are meant for export to other countries of CA,
Russia, Afghanistan, and beyond. Similar plants are also planned in conjunc-
tion with other Chinese producers (such as Zhejiang Jiyou) in the Jizakh free
economic area.53
Similar protocols for intentions to establish production plants for ceramics
with Peng Yu Special Ceramics and Zhongguo Jingdezhen Porcelain, and
a porcelain production plant with Ru Hong, have been signed.54 Although
the documents signed with representatives of these companies were protocols
of intention without ﬁrm commitments, in June and July 2017 the represen-
tatives visited possible sites for plant construction and discussed conditions
with various ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Foreign
Investments Agency, and the State Committee for Competition Controls.
Among the agreements signed between the two countries, Sun Paper
Industry and China National Complete Plant Import & Export signed a pro-
tocol of intentions with the government to create a cluster for the production
of high-quality paper in the Angren free economic zone.55 Uzbekistan
currently does not have such facilities and needs to import much of the
51. “Uzbekistan and China Will Create Production of Joint Venture on Production of Toys,”
Gazeta, August 2, 2017, <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/08/02/toys/>, accessed August 4, 2017.
52. For details, see “Klaster po vypusku igrushek stoimost’yu 23 mln pyavitsya v Tashkente”
[Cluster producing toys costing 23 mln will appear in Tashkent], Gazeta.uz, September 13, 2017,
<https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/09/13/cluster/>, accessed September 14, 2017.
53. “Zhejiang Jiyou Industrial Co. Ltd. May Create Capacities for Toy Production in
Uzbekistan,” Uzdaily.uz, July 3, 2017, <https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-39970.htm>, accessed
September 23, 2017.
54. “FEZ ‘Angren’ May Become the Largest Producer of Porcelain in the Country,” Uzbekis-
tanToday, July 3, 2017, <http://ut.uz/en/business/fez-angren-may-become-the-largest-producer-of-
porcelain-in-the-country/>, accessed September 23, 2017.
55. “COMPLANT planiruet organizovat’ proizvodstvo bumagi v Uzbekistan” [COMPLANT
plans to organize production of paper in Uzbekistan], Obschestvo Druzhby Kitaj-Uzbekistan, Sep-
tember 18, 2017, <http://china-uz-friendship.com/?p¼12945>, accessed September 23, 2017.
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high-quality paper used in ofﬁce paperwork, as well as for wrapping and
shipping the goods produced in various plants.56 Delegations from these
companies visited Uzbekistan in September 2017 to evaluate the needs and
coordinate the supplies of equipment with local counterparts.
In terms of the export of Uzbek-made products, the agreements signed
during the May 2017 visit of President Mirziyoyev included textile exports
(US$ 300 million), leather (US$ 60 million), and agricultural products
(US$ 1.6 million) in 2017–18. These contracts are in active implementation,
and the majority are being implemented. Also, cotton-processing and textile
mills have been planned, with Chinese participation, in Qashqadaryo for
2017–19. Seven textile mills are under construction in Qashqadaryo, and its
overall cotton processing capacity will account for 10% of the annual cotton
output of the Qashqadaryo Region.57 The Litai project aims to create 500
jobs, using textile machinery from the Saurer Group, and to produce 22,000
tons of high-level cotton yarn annually, 80% for export.58 Wenzhou Jin-
sheng Trading announced that it will initiate seven investment projects in
the Jizzakh economic zone, investing US$ 40 million in reprocessing local
resources and producing leather goods and metal products, one-third to be
exported out of Uzbekistan.59
CONCLUSION
A few conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of cooperation between
Uzbekistan and China in this article. Uzbekistan’s relations with China in
the year after the death of President Karimov and of the opening up of
Uzbekistan to the international community demonstrate that the master
narrative overestimates Chinese domination in both agenda-setting and
project implementation in areas of economic cooperation. Although both
56. “V Uzbekistane budet sozdano SP po proizvodstvu bumagi” [Uzbekistan will create joint
venture on production of paper], Uzreport, September 18, 2017, <https://uzreport.news/economy/
v-uzbekistane-budet-sozdano-sp-po-proizvodstvu-bumajnoy-produktsii>, accessed September 23, 2017.
57. “Uzbekistan President Visits Litai Silk Road Park,” Jinsheng, March 4, 2017, <http://www
.jinshengroup.com/en/stations/532661b60b/index.php/5327ed9b0a?id¼161>, accessed September
23, 2017.
58. Ibid.
59. “Kitaj pomozhet realizovat v SEZ ‘Jizzakh’ proekty stoimost’yu $40 millionov” [China will
help implement projects worth 40 million in Jizzakh SEZ], Sputnik, August 11, 2017, <http://ru
.sputniknews-uz.com/economy/20170811/6014975/kitai-sez-djizak-proekti.html>, accessed Septem-
ber 23, 2017.
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China and Uzbekistan are attempting to shape their new foreign policies in
a changing international environment, most of the projects detailed in this
article focus on areas that are deﬁned as highly important for either Uzbek-
istan or China. It does not appear that China is using its economic power to
pressure smaller Uzbekistan. There are several factors that allow Uzbekistan
to maintain its relations with China without sacriﬁcing its own interests.
First, in case one or more projects collapse, Uzbekistan has been diversiying
its strategic partners and building ties with alternative countries. This pro-
vides a diverse selection of partners for particular developmental goals. It
also keeps some pressure on China not to dominate the cooperation agenda
if it sees value in engaging Uzbekistan.
Second, Sino–Uzbek relations demonstrate that neither China’s nor Uz-
bekistan’s foreign policy behavior has a static structure or goal. Analysts and
observers tend to emphasize the dominating tendencies of Chinese economic
expansion (by emphasizing energy resources) or its agenda for negotiations.
The projects described in this article demonstrate that a majority of the
cooperative initiatives are products of social construction between the main
actors and their negotiations. The funded and facilitated projects in Uzbek-
istan do not represent a “one-way street” of Chinese expansionist policy.
Third, the outcomes of this cooperation are greatly inﬂuenced by the
respective government bureaucracies and their facilitation of interstate coop-
eration. In countries where the governments play similar proactive roles in
deﬁning economic policies, the role of bureaucracies is instrumental in ensur-
ing productive cooperation. In Uzbekistan’s policy in respect to China, its
strategy for development and its overall goals of diversifying the economy and
orienting industry toward exports serve as markers for the Uzbek bureaucracy
when deciding priorities. Those guidelines and bureaucratic procedures of
agenda-setting assist in streamlining the agenda of cooperation with China in
a desirable direction, not only for Chinese interests but also for the cooperat-
ing partner, in this case Uzbekistan.
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